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INTRODUCTION 
An enduring and controversial question is the extent of American Indian 
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.1  Twenty-first-century nonmem-
bers2 often object to being haled into tribal court where the judge and jury 
may be primarily Indians and where the laws, procedures, and court buildings 
bring the veneer of state courts but not the same perceived gravitas.3  This is 
nothing new.  Nineteenth century non-Indians likely shared the same discom-
fort when subjected to tribal laws and regulations.4 
And yet, in recent decades, more and more nonmembers routinely con-
sent to tribal laws, and they do so to enjoy the benefit of modern tribal gov-
ernance, services, protection, and business opportunities.  Modern Indian na-
tions are serious economic players in many parts of the United States and are 
often the largest and most stable employers in large swaths of regional terri-
tories.  As this Article will show, the 567 federally recognized Indian nations5 
employ hundreds of thousands of American citizens who are not members of 
an Indian nation.  Indian nations and nonmember business partners do bil-
lions of dollars of business every year.  Thousands of nonmembers lease 
housing, grazing lands, mineral rights, and other properties from Indian na-
tions.  And many thousands enjoy the benefits of tribal government services, 
                                                          
 1.  Leading Supreme Court cases include Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choc-
taw Indians, 135 S. Ct. 2833 (2015), Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 
554 U.S. 316 (2008), Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 
U.S. 353 (2001), Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 
U.S. 679 (1993), Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408 (1989), Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo 
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985), Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 
U.S. 845 (1985), Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), and Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 2.  This Article will primarily use the term “nonmembers” to denote those persons who are 
not members of a federally recognized Indian nation.  However, in recognition of certain historical 
contexts, the Article will also use “white man” or a derivative, “non-Indian,” or “noncitizen” inter-
changeably with “nonmembers.” 
 3.  See generally Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Prac-
tical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187 (2010) (surveying cases). 
 4.  E.g., Hamilton v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 282 (1907) (affirming tribal authority to confis-
cate Indian trader’s assets for failure to comply with Chickasaw permitting laws). 
 5.  Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 80 Fed. Reg. 1942 (Jan. 14, 2015) (listing 566 federally recognized Indian na-
tions).  The government recognized one additional tribe since the promulgation of this list.  Final 
Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of the Pamunkey Indian Tribe, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,144 
(July 8, 2015). 
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from health care to social services to public safety protections.  Indian gam-
ing alone is nearly a $30 billion industry.6  Federal expenditures for tribal 
government services was about $4.4 billion in 1999.7 
This, too, is nothing new.  Though the scale of Indian tribal economic 
activity in the nineteenth century pales in comparison to twenty-first century 
tribal economies, many nineteenth century American citizens flocked to In-
dian country to exploit economic opportunities.  These nonmembers and 
noncitizens applied for and received tribal permits to work for Indian land-
owners.  They procured licenses from tribal governments to do business on 
reservation lands.  They became Indian traders licensed by the United States 
in exchange for the right to do business in Indian country.  They married 
Indian women, often after receiving formal tribal permission, to gain access 
to trading markets and property rights.  Some even acquired tribal member-
ship through intermarriage, with all of the benefits and obligations that citi-
zenship entailed, including limited treaty rights.  They paid tribal taxes. 
This Article intends to compare the modern practices and understand-
ings of nonmembers doing business with Indian nations and inside of Indian 
country with the analogous practices and understandings of non-Indians en-
gaged in similar activities in the period before the modern Indian self-deter-
mination era.  Though non-Indians and nonmembers occasionally object to 
tribal jurisdiction, the long history of tribal governance and economic regu-
lation demonstrates that nonmembers have received and continue to receive 
the benefit of a bargain that places them under considerable tribal regulation 
in exchange for access to tribal markets.  For nonmembers to argue that they 
have not consented to tribal jurisdiction, at any stage of American history, is 
to ignore the very real economic benefits the nonmembers have received 
from their Indian country business activities.  It is to claim something for 
nothing. 
I.  HISTORICAL BARGAINS 
The pre-contact American Indian commercial markets and trading fairs 
were extraordinary affairs covering the whole of what is now American ter-
ritory.  These networks and markets continued for centuries after the arrival 
of European outsiders from overseas.8  Lakes and rivers were the commercial 
superhighways of North American Indian markets, allowing Indian people to 
                                                          
 6.  Randall K. Q. Akee, Katherine A. Spilde & Jonathan B. Taylor, The Indian Gaming Reg-
ulatory Act and Its Effects on American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 3, 
2015, at 185, 194. 
 7.  Id. at 189. 
 8.  ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY 21–22 (2012). 
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transport goods over a thousand miles.9  Regularly held Indian trading fairs 
were enormous and may have included thousands of Indian peoples repre-
senting dozens of Indian nations.10  For example, in 1805, Lewis and Clark 
were amazed to find enormous trading fairs drawing Indians from dozens of 
tribes.11  Nonmembers, even enemies, would be adopted into the tribal com-
munity to allow for more effective and inclusive trading.12  A limited form 
of tribal citizenship, then, could be a formal prerequisite to Indian trade, a 
kind of permission to access the Indian market. 
The French and Spanish, then the Dutch and the British, and finally the 
Americans, bargained to access the Indian commercial market.  Tribal com-
mercial practices adapted to meet the new trading partners’ particular notions 
of property rights and trade.13  The newcomers also adapted to the Indian 
practices, as the historical survey in Part I of this Article shows, with non-
Indians, nonmembers, and noncitizens making significant concessions to In-
dian nations and Indian people in order to access the Indian market. 
After the conclusion of the American Revolution, western Indian lands 
and resources quickly became a target of American economic interests.  
While there was much disruption among the Indian nations, many lands, such 
as that in the Ohio River Valley, remained under the control and ownership 
of Indian nations.  In the early decades of the American Republic, federally 
licensed traders entered Indian country en masse, bargaining to enter the In-
dian markets as had been the norm for centuries.  Americans began trying to 
acquire Indian land and their resources, however, through the vast land ces-
sion treaties of the early nineteenth century that also established Indian res-
ervations, as will be shown in this part of the Article. 
                                                          
 9.  Id. at 22; ATLAS OF GREAT LAKES INDIAN HISTORY 6 (Helen Hornbeck Tanner ed., 1987) 
(“A complete geographic description of the Great Lakes Region[] . . . draws attention first to the 
Straits of Mackinac connecting Lake Huron and Lake Michigan, and to the St. Marys River flowing 
from Lake Superior to Lake Huron.  This vital crossroads was the center of a trade and communi-
cations network permeating the Great Lakes Region and by extensions reaching the Great Plains of 
the Canadian and American West, Hudson Bay, the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico.”).  See 
generally Henry F. Dobyns, Trade Centers: The Concept and a Rancherian Culture Area Example, 
8 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J., no. 1, 1984, at 23, 23 (“Native Americans developed during 
prehistoric times a continent-wide system of trade between ethnic groups.”). 
 10.  MILLER, supra note 8, at 22.  
 11.  Id. at 22, 23.  
 12.  Id. at 23 (“Trade was so important and integral to these communities and their economies 
that enemies would be temporarily and ceremonially adopted into the tribe to engage in trade.”). 
 13.  Id. at 23 (“Tribes and Indians were also readily adaptable to the new economic activities 
and trading partners that arrived from Europe. . . .  Various tribal practices and principles of prop-
erty ownership were influenced by and adapted to this new commercial activity.”); Susan Sleeper-
Smith, Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World, in RETHINKING THE FUR TRADE: 
CULTURES OF EXCHANGE IN AN ATLANTIC WORLD, xxxvii, xxxvii–xlvi (Susan Sleeper-Smith ed., 
2009) (describing the tribal transformation into “Indians as Consumers”). 
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But Americans would not stop at reservation borders.  Demand for In-
dian resources in traditional Indian homelands almost always morphed into 
demand for reservation resources.  The demand for reservation resources 
brought many American citizens to Indian country seeking access to reser-
vation assets.  Here, too, non-Indians had several options and strategies for 
accessing Indian markets and usually accepted some form of tribal regulation 
in bargaining for access. 
A.  Federally Licensed Indian Traders 
The end of the American Revolution saw the United States quickly 
move towards establishing commercial relationships with Indian nations and 
Indian people as a means of governing Indian affairs.  The federal govern-
ment was very interested in acquiring Indian lands and resources but was 
hampered by a lack of political capital to do so.  The United States had lim-
ited capacity to militarily engage Indian nations and was concerned that un-
scrupulous traders could be a continual source of violent conflict between 
Indians and whites.  And so, the United States sought to continue earlier co-
lonial efforts by the Dutch, French, and English to license and regulate trad-
ers.  The first treaties with southern Indian nations in the 1780s included pro-
visions for the regulation of Indian traders.14  The confederate Congress 
enacted ordinances attempting to govern Indian commercial relationships be-
yond those established by treaties, but these laws failed due to lack of en-
forcement.15 
The Framers of the Constitution vested Congress with a general power 
over Indian affairs through the exclusive, plenary power to regulate com-
merce with Indian tribes.16  As it did with interstate commerce, congressional 
control over Indian commerce grew expansively and quickly, guided by rec-
ommendations from Henry Knox, who proposed a focus on the purchase of 
Indian lands instead of acquisition by conquest.17  The First Congress quickly 
asserted control over Indian commerce in 1790.18  That year, the United 
States enacted the first Trade and Intercourse Act.19  Congress repeatedly 
reauthorized that and other trade and intercourse laws until 1834, when it 
                                                          
 14.  Mario Gonzalez, Regulation of Indian Traders: A Historical Perspective, 5 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 313, 321 & 337 n.90 (1977) (citing Treaty with the Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18; Treaty 
with the Choctaw, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21; Treaty with the Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24). 
 15.  Id. at 321–22. 
 16.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  See generally Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Com-
merce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015); Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE 
L.J. 999 (2014). 
 17.  Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 322. 
 18.  Id. at 323 (citing Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137). 
 19.  Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137. 
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enacted a permanent series of statutes that included the Indian Trader stat-
utes.20  Indian trader statutes are still extant,21 though it is not clear if the 
United States continues to license traders in the twenty-first century.  The 
Indian trader regulations are completely out of date; they refer to federal of-
fices that no longer exist, such as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,22 and 
assume Indians will only pay in cash.23 
Federal policy, however, was only one part of the equation.  Indian 
trader laws regulated American citizens who would become traders with the 
Indians, but federal licenses did not automatically mandate or provide en-
trance into Indian country markets.  Merely providing American traders ac-
cess to Indian country was only step one.  Trade within Indian country was 
the domain of Indian nations and tribal governments, and Indian trade on the 
ground was heavily dependent on reciprocal relationships.24  For example, 
Potawatomi leaders rose to power based in part on their ability to “broker 
deals” with Indian traders.25  Intratribal political disputes in the southeast 
arose between the Creek and Choctaw nations in the early eighteenth century 
because of disputed control over trade with the British.26 
                                                          
 20.  Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (partially codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 261–65 (2012)). 
 21.  See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 261–64 (2012).  
 22.  25 C.F.R. § 140.9 (2016). 
 23.  25 C.F.R. § 140.24 (2016). 
 24.  W. Ben Secunda, To Cede or Seed? Risk and Identity Among the Woodland Potawatomi 
During the Removal Period, 31 MIDCONTINENTAL J. ARCHEOLOGY 57, 80 (2006) (noting success-
ful efforts to enhance “traditional value[s] of reciprocity” between Potawatomi villages and Amer-
ican traders and missionaries in the nineteenth century); cf. Marty O’Shea, Springfield’s Puritans 
and Indians: 1636–1655, HIST. J. MASS., Winter 1998, at 46, 52 (1998) (noting that seventeenth-
century colonists agreed to compensate Massachusetts Indians if colonial livestock damaged Indian 
lands). 
 25.  Secunda, supra note 24, at 60 (explaining that in Potawatomi villages, tribal members 
“formed around a leader who demonstrated a capacity to broker deals, secure goods, and otherwise 
provide for the well being of his followers”); see also id. at 76 (“[Potawatomi leaders] were inviting 
their own missionaries as well as conducting their own business with selected laborers and traders.  
The exchange was being managed by the Potawatomi village leaders themselves.”). 
 26.  Kevin T. Harrell, The Terrain of Factionalism: How Upper Creek Communities Negotiated 
the Recourse of Gulf Coast Trade, 1763–1780, 68 ALA. REV. 74, 90 (2015).  As Professor Harrell 
explains:  
  Many Upper Creek headmen expressed concerns about the southern trade.  The entre-
preneurial spirit emerging from companies like John McGillivray’s along the Gulf coast 
invited a flourish of commercialism.  Traders might no longer need to travel through 
Creek lands to access the Choctaws, nor were the Chickasaws as distant.  The commercial 
and military advantages for the Choctaws were also glaringly apparent.  The Choctaws 
could easily control a southern trade corridor from Mobile, denying the Upper Creeks a 
role in regulating the western flow of goods that passed through their towns.  Addition-
ally, as Joshua Piker argues, competition between southern and northern Upper Creek 
factions and town leaders arose in response to this trade and the new settlements.  North-
ern Upper Creek towns like Okfuskee and Okchai benefited diplomatically and commer-
cially from the generations-old overland paths and the interpersonal and inter-communal 
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Tribes barred traders from accessing the market without permission.  
Permission could mean that Indian traders must somehow acquire tribal citi-
zenship or familial ties with the tribe to earn that permission.  Kinship ties 
created between Indian traders and tribal members bound together the groups 
both politically and socially.  Indian traders married into the tribe, worked 
for the tribe as interpreters, and otherwise took on the rights and responsibil-
ities that tribal rules and norms required of relatives.27  The “real source of 
power” in the trading relationship during this time was not the federal gov-
ernment and its Indian trader statutes, but a “[n]ative political imaginary” 
delineating the boundaries of the trading spaces.28 
Even Congress, at times, seemed to understand that tribal regulations 
were of greater import than federal Indian trader statutes, which proved to be 
an ineffective means to govern Indian trade.29  In 1834, a critical year in fed-
eral Indian policy,30 Congress expressed hope that Indian nations would ad-
dress the problem of unscrupulous trading by federally licensed Indian trad-
ers.  During the discussion of the Western Territory bill,31 a bill that would 
have recognized the Indian Territory as the State of Sequoyah, the House of 
Representatives hoped that Indian nations would assert greater regulatory en-
forcement over Indian traders, relieving the Interior Department of the obli-
gation.32 
                                                          
relationships linking their towns with Augusta, Savannah, and Charlestown.  Conversely, 
southern Upper Creek towns were more geographically situated to benefit from south-
erly-river courses and land routes just as they had been under the French regime.  This, 
perhaps, best explains why some Upper Creek headmen favored trade from the Gulf 
coast, while others were vehemently opposed. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (first citing GEORGIA AND FLORIDA TREATIES, 1763–1776, 12 EARLY 
AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS: TREATIES AND LAWS, 1607–1789, at 217–19 (John T. Juricek ed., 
2002); and then citing Joshua A. Piker, “White & Clean” & Contested: Creek Towns and Trading 
Paths in the Aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, 50 ETHNOHISTORY 315, 315–47 (2003)). 
 27.  MICHAEL WITGEN, AN INFINITY OF NATIONS: HOW THE NATIVE NEW WORLD SHAPED 
EARLY NORTH AMERICA 33 (2012). 
 28.  Id. at 138. 
 29.  E.g., Izumi Ishii, Alcohol and Politics in the Cherokee Nation Before Removal, 50:4 
ETHNOHISTORY 671, 674 (2003) (noting that “[t]he Trade and Intercourse Act did not regulate the 
actions of Indians who were conducting business with other Indians within their own nations”).  See 
generally Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 324–25 (noting abuses of Indian traders, justifying additional 
federal regulation in 1834). 
 30.  That year saw the passage of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834.  Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 
161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012)). 
 31.  The legislative history of this bill, which was never enacted, was cited favorably by the 
Supreme Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201–02, 201 n.12, 202 n.13 
(1978). 
 32.  H. EVERETT, REGULATING THE INDIAN DEPARTMENT, H.R. REP. NO. 23-474, at 19 
(1834).  Congressman Everett stated: 
  The regulations of trade and intercourse among the tribes should be liberal and uni-
form; such regulations must be made either by the United States, or by the tribes.  They 
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By that time, it was well established that federal government efforts to 
regulate Indian traders had failed.  Indian traders in many tribal communities 
were exploitative and abusive.33 They sold liquor illegally to Indian people 
and engaged in other illegal trade activities, such as the slave trade and smug-
gling.34  Indian nations from around the country complained about these trad-
ers.35  A few tribes were hamstrung by treaty provisions that precluded tribal 
regulatory jurisdiction over federally licensed Indian traders.36  Other tribes 
entered into treaties with the United States, which provided that the federal 
government would enforce Indian trader laws and regulations.37  As Congress 
noted in 1834, no legal bar existed to prevent tribal regulation of federally 
licensed Indian traders.38  Possession of a federal trading license did not 
equate to immunity from state or tribal regulation.  States could and did tax 
Indian trader stocks, as Indian traders were private business entities, not fed-
eral agents.39  However, relatively few tribal governments acted formally, 
perhaps deferring to individual tribal members’ dependence on trade goods. 
Tribal kinship networks were expanded not only by advantageous trad-
ers, but also through marriages between Indians and non-Indians based in 
love.40  There are numerous instances where non-Indian men and women 
married into tribal families and became tribal members socially, politically, 
                                                          
will be more satisfactory if made by them, than if made by us, and it must be our desire 
to do nothing for them which they can do for themselves.   
Id.  
 33.  E.g., ALFRED A. CAVE, LETHAL ENCOUNTERS: ENGLISHMEN AND INDIANS IN COLONIAL 
VIRGINIA 144 (2011) (detailing how the confluence of suspicion and fear of Native Americans was 
used as a justification in the exploitation and abuse of tribal members); LEWIS O. SAUM, THE FUR 
TRADER AND THE INDIAN (1965). 
 34.  See generally DAVID M. DELO, PEDDLERS AND POST TRADERS: THE ARMY SUTLER ON 
THE FRONTIER (1998); WILLIAM E. UNRAU, WHITE MAN’S WICKED WATER: THE ALCOHOL 
TRADE AND PROHIBITION IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 1802–1892 (1996). 
 35.  JOINT SPECIAL COMMITTEE APPOINTED UNDER JOINT RESOLUTION OF MAR. 3, 1865, 
CONDITION OF THE INDIAN TRIBES app. 365 (1867) (“I met and conferred with a large number of 
the chiefs of the different bands of the Sioux.  Nearly all complained of the violation of their treaties, 
and the bad faith, dishonesty, and misconduct of the agents and traders.  They say the goods de-
signed for them under their treaties with the government do not reach them; that they are taken by 
their agents, traders, &c.”) (statement of Hon. A.W. Hubbard, commissioner). 
 36.  E.g., Treaty with the Sacs and Foxes art. 8, Nov. 3, 1804, 7 Stat. 84 (providing that “the 
said tribes do promise and agree that they will not suffer any trader to reside amongst them without 
[a federal] license”). 
 37.  E.g., Treaty with the Teton, Yancton, and Yanctonies Bands of the Sioux Tribe of Indians 
art. V, June 22, 1825, 7 Stat. 250–51 (providing “that for injuries done by individuals, no private 
revenge or retaliation shall take place, but instead thereof, complaints shall be made, by the party 
injured, to the superintendent or agent of Indian affairs, or other person appointed by the President”). 
 38.  EVERETT, supra note 32.  
 39.  E.g., Truscott v. Hurlbut Land & Cattle Co., 73 F. 60, 65 (9th Cir. 1896); Moore v. Beeson, 
51 P. 875, 877 (Wyo. 1898). 
 40.  FRANCIS E. LEUPP, THE INDIAN AND HIS PROBLEM 344–45 (1918) (describing “the 
squaw-man”). 
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and most importantly, legally.  Instructive is the case of Janis v. United 
States.41  This is the classic “squaw man” case, holding that a man who had 
married into a Lakota tribal community is no longer entitled to bring a claim 
for Indian depredations in the court of claims after Indians stole his cattle 
because the court considered the man to be an Indian.42  Other courts have 
mentioned white men that married into tribal communities, acquired tribal 
membership, and may have even acquired a property interest in land as a 
result of their tribal relations.  In United States v. Rowell,43 for example, the 
Supreme Court rejected a property claim by a white man that had acquired 
tribal membership through marriage.44  The Court specifically acknowledged 
that the United States had the power to award an allotment to Rowell, an 
adopted member of the tribe.45  Courts also held that intermarriage, captivity, 
or other acts of immersion into Indian communities, such as adoption, could 
put an American citizen beyond the reach and protections of American law.46 
In the southwest, French and Spanish traders followed the Caddo tribe’s 
lead in trading protocols from the beginning to the end of the exchange, 
“making clear the Caddos’ power over their European visitors.”47  These new 
traders “learned and obeyed the rules governing visits” to Caddo communi-
ties.48  One requirement was that Spanish men bring their own wives with 
them.  This was a way for the Caddo to regulate and limit intermarriage, 
which protected Caddo women from abuse, and showed that “they expected 
those who settled among them and became part of Caddo societies to be 
                                                          
 41.  32 Ct. Cl. 407 (1897). 
 42.  Id. at 411 (“The principle which governs it is that when a citizen of the United States carries 
his property voluntarily into the Indian country, makes the home of the Indians his home, casts in 
his lot as a resident with them, he becomes subject, so far as his property is involved, to the risks of 
a natural-born Indian, and to that extent must be considered as one of the tribe.”). 
 43.  243 U.S. 464 (1917). 
 44.  Id. at 466–67 (“James F. Rowell is a white man who went to the large reservation as an 
Indian trader in 1899 and has since lived with these Indians.  He is a physician and has practiced 
among them.  In 1903 he married a Kiowa woman and in 1909 was adopted as a member of the 
tribe.”). 
 45.  Id. at 468 (“In view of the scope of this power, as reflected by over a century of practice 
and by the decisions of this court, we think it was quite admissible for Congress to give effect to 
Rowell’s status as an adopted member of the tribe, to recognize his claim to an allotment out of the 
tribal lands, to designate the land which he should receive and to direct that it be conveyed to him 
by a patent in fee without awaiting the expiration of the usual trust period of twenty-five years.”). 
 46.  See, e.g., Ruffner v. McLenan, 16 Ohio 639, 643 (1847) (“It may be assumed as a fact, that 
within the territory now constituting the State of Ohio, there was not a white man at the date of the 
ordinance, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.  There might have been some few Indian 
traders, and were undoubtedly some whites who had been made captives by the Indians, and who 
had been adopted into, and had become members of their different tribes.”). 
 47.  JULIANA BARR, PEACE CAME IN THE FORM OF A WOMAN: INDIANS AND SPANIARDS IN 
THE TEXAS BORDERLANDS 27 (2007).  
 48.  Id. at 52.  
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properly equipped to contribute to those societies.”49  The trading relation-
ship between the Spanish and the Caddo broke down, however, when the 
Spanish failed to bring their own wives and children with them to the small 
settlement communities, thus failing to show the reciprocal respect for Caddo 
women within the community hierarchy.50  In contrast, French traders who 
engaged in “family-based settlement[s]” were allowed to intermarry with 
Caddo women and engage and rise in the hierarchy of Caddo society, thus 
providing economic benefits and obtaining the loyalty of the Caddo as al-
lies.51  Indigenous nations in the southwest retained their power over Euro-
pean and American traders for more than a century after their northeastern 
counterparts, because settler survival was only assured by reciprocal relation-
ships with the more powerful Indian nations.52 
This tribal regulation of nonmember business activities and intermar-
riage in the southwest has survived well into the modern era.  Some pueblo 
nations, for example, continue to bar or severely restrict nonmember business 
activities.53  Other pueblos continue to restrict intermarriage.54  The Jicarilla 
Apache Nation allows nonmembers to marry into the tribe without permis-
sion, but those nonmembers must receive permission from the tribal council 
to do business with the tribe.55 
                                                          
 49.  Id. at 70. 
 50.  Id. at 61–63. 
 51.  Id. at 71. 
 52.  Id. at 288–89.  For more scholarship on situations where Native tribes exercised the ma-
jority of authority in their relationships with Europeans, see generally NED BLACKHAWK, 
VIOLENCE OVER THE LAND: INDIANS AND EMPIRES IN THE EARLY AMERICAN WEST (2006) (Great 
Basin), KATHLEEN DUVAL, THE NATIVE GROUND: INDIANS AND COLONISTS IN THE HEART OF 
THE CONTINENT (2007) (Arkansas River Valley), and PEKKA HÄMÄLÄINEN, THE COMANCHE 
EMPIRE (2008) (New Mexico and Texas).  
 53.  Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in 
American Indian Tribal Courts (Part II of II), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 509, 525 (1998).  Professors 
Cooter and Fikentscher discuss the diverse regulations that pueblo nations impose on nonmember 
businesses seeking to enter pueblo markets:  
Usually the tribal council must decide whether to permit a business to acquire land and 
begin operating on a reservation.  Business on the reservation, especially if run by out-
siders, can have difficulty obtaining land or permits.  Some tribes do not permit business 
by outsiders on the reservation (e.g., Sandia Pueblo, which is near Albuquerque).  In San 
Felipe Pueblo, everything depends on what the kind of business it is.  Under certain con-
ditions, in Santo Domingo Pueblo an outsider may get a permission from the tribal coun-
cil. 
Id.  
 54.  Id. at 545–47. 
 55.  Id. at 545. 
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B.  Great Lakes Trade 
Intermarriage as a form of entry into Indian trade markets was very 
strong in the western Great Lakes region well into the American era.  Amer-
ican citizens, sometimes armed with a federal Indian trader license and some-
times not, often used intermarriage to form the kinship ties necessary to ac-
cess the fur trade.  It was an old tactic, if not a ritual, going back to the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the French began marrying An-
ishinaabe women.56 
The American fur trade started with French and Dutch in the late six-
teenth century.57  With the arrival of European colonists in the seventeenth 
century came the introduction of government regulation of the fur trade; ab-
sent the regulation, colonial governments feared unscrupulous traders would 
swindle Indian traders or encroach on Indian hunting territories, creating of-
ten-violent conflict.58  However, the regulations were simply not effective, 
forcing non-Indian traders to adapt by immersing themselves deeper into In-
dian communities to forge profitable and efficient trade activities.59 
Anishinaabe trade prior to the twentieth century was a highly propertied 
affair.  Families and clans formed complex property rights structures to con-
trol fishing, farming, ricing, hunting, trapping, sugaring, and other productive 
activities.60  Distribution of Anishinaabe-produced goods were also subject 
to complex property systems.  As the French before them—but less so the 
British—Americans married into Anishinaabe families.  They typically 
served as middle-men between Indian producers and non-Indian purchasers 
of Great Lakes trade goods.  They lived in large houses on Mackinac Island 
                                                          
 56.  SUSAN SLEEPER-SMITH, INDIAN WOMEN AND FRENCH MEN: RETHINKING CULTURAL 
ENCOUNTER IN THE WESTERN GREAT LAKES 16–17, 19 (2001). 
 57.  Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 313. 
 58.  Id. at 314–16. 
 59.  These unlicensed traders were often called coureurs de bois, or “runners of the woods.”  
Despite the dangers of being unlicensed, the potential profits from the early fur trade were so high 
that it encouraged traders to enter the woods unlicensed and form kinship relations with tribes to 
make engage in trade instead of brandishing licenses.  See generally GEORGES-HÉBERT GERMAIN, 
ADVENTURERS IN THE NEW WORLD: THE SAGA OF THE COUREURS DES BOIS (2003). 
 60.  See generally Frank G. Speck, The Family Hunting Band as the Basis of Algonkian Social 
Organization, 17 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 289 (1915); Dean R. Snow, Wabanaki “Family Hunting 
Territories”, 70 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST (NEW SERIES) 1143 (1968). 
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and often prospered.61  But they also acquired obligations to the Anishinaabe 
families and clans into which they married.62 
As a general matter, non-Indians not part of the Anishinaabe production 
and distribution could be nothing more than mere passive participants in 
trade.  The western Great Lakes were not empty places where non-Indians 
could walk in and set up camp.  Trade secrets such as locations of good fish-
ing and trapping, or wintertime lodges, or good routes to reach what is now 
called the St. Lawrence Seaway, would not be given away to the first white 
men who walked into the area.  Many early French traders realized that ac-
cess to trade secrets was closely guarded by familial and clan relationships.  
If non-Indians were to access and exploit Anishinaabe production and distri-
bution markets, then they would have to form familial and clan relationships.  
Many did.63 
As the British replaced the French after the French and Indian Wars, the 
Anishinaabeg expected the British to make concessions to access the Indian 
market.64  Professor McDonnell explains, “[i]f the British wished to occupy 
                                                          
 61.  See generally John E. McDowell, Therese Schindler of Mackinac: Upward Mobility in the 
Great Lakes Fur Trade, 61 WIS. MAG. OF HIST. 125 (1978); Lucy Eldersveld Murphy, Public Moth-
ers: Native American and Métis Women as Creole Mediators in the Nineteenth-Century Midwest, 
14 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 142, 155-56 (2003); Elizabeth A. Scott, A Feminist Approach to Historical 
Archaeology: Eighteenth-Century Fur Trade Society at Michilimackinac, 25 HIST. ARCHEOLOGY 
42 (1991). 
 62.  Cf. Michael A. McDonnell, Maintaining a Balance of Power: Michilimackinac, the An-
ishinaabe Odawas, and the Anglo-Indian War of 1763, 13 EARLY AM. STUD. 38, 49 (2015).  Ac-
cording to Professor McDonnell:  
French officials constantly complained that métis traders confounded efforts to impose 
imperial policies at places like Michilimackinac—because they acted too much in the 
interests of their Indian kin.  Historians have tended to view men such as Langlade as go-
betweens, or mediators, and as métis, but his Indian kin were just as likely to see him as 
Anishinaabe.  As one French official complained as early as 1709, the children born of 
mixed marriages “try to create as many difficulties as possible for the French.” 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 33 MICHIGAN HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 454 (Michigan Pioneer & 
Historical Society ed., 1904)). 
 63.  E.g., id. at 49 (“A Nassauekueton Odawa (nation de la Fourche) woman named Domitilde, 
for example, married one in 1712, and, after his death, she married Augustin Langlade in the 1720s.  
Their son, Charles Langlade, became one of the most influential and well-known figures from Mich-
ilimackinac.”); Murphy, supra note 61, at 144 (“People who had been born in the Great Lakes 
region, residents of towns such as Green Bay, Prairie du Chien, St. Louis, Vincennes, Detroit, and 
Mackinac, included French and Anglo-American fur traders and related workers, Indian wives, and 
some of their kin, and a wide variety of young and old Métis people, with a few African Ameri-
cans.”). 
Nineteenth-century court decisions involve many fact patterns relating to intermarriage.  For 
example, see the Michigan Supreme Court case of Stockton v. Williams, 1 Doug. 546 (Mich. 1845), 
a case of alleged identity theft.  In that case, an Anishinaabe woman, Mokitchenoqua (aka Nancy 
Smith), the child of Jacob Smith, an Indian trader, alleging that another Anishinaabe woman, Mo-
kitchenoqua (aka Elizabeth Lyons), the child of yet another Indian trader, Archibald Lyons, stole 
her lands. 
 64.  E.g., McDonnell, supra note 62, at 40. 
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the French posts and establish a trade with the western nations, they would 
have to do so on Indian terms. . . .  [N]ewcomers would have to follow long-
established customs in return for their occupation of the posts and their trade 
with the Indians.”65  After some uncertainty, and after the 1763 Anishinaabe 
uprising against the British, British traders and other interests became de-
pendent on the Odawa Indians of northern lower Michigan.66  Like the French 
before them, the British bargained for entrance into the Indian market, rely-
ing on the same method of intermarriage and compliance with Indian tradi-
tions and norms.67 
By 1820, the time the United States formally asserted control over what 
is now Michigan, Anishinaabe culture had changed along with the economic 
changes brought by the influx of French, then British, then American inter-
ests and individuals.  The famed Michigan Indian agent Henry Schoolcraft’s 
career is instructive.  Though he was a government agent and not strictly an 
economic player, Schoolcraft married into a prominent mixed Ojibwe family 
with control over much of the Upper Peninsula’s fur trade.  He married 
Bamewawagezhikaquay, or Jane Johnston, daughter of John Johnston and 
Ozhaguscodaywayquay/O-shaw-gus-co-day-way-quah.68  O-shaw-gus-co-
day-way-quah’s father was Waubojeeb, an important Lake Superior Ojibwe 
ogema.69  John Johnston’s marriage “transformed him into a successful Lake 
Superior trader, and his wife became one of the most powerful women in the 
region.”70  Schoolcraft benefitted from these familial relationships during his 
long tenure as Indian agent in the western Great Lakes.  It could be said that 
a critical key to his success as a government official was his decision to enter 
into a familial relationship with an important and wealthy Michigan Ojibwe 
                                                          
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 79.  Professor McDonnell contends:  
  With a flourishing population, a strategic location, and a dense and widespread kinship 
and alliance network, the Odawas at Waganakising especially reclaimed and commanded 
a privileged place in both Indian and British councils.  From 1763 the British—unlike 
many historians of colonial America—would never again fail to take note of Michili-
mackinac.  Nor would they mistake Detroit as the decision-making center of the “western 
nations.”  The Odawas and their Green Bay allies had provided an early demonstration 
of the importance of the straits and the different strategic alliances at play in the pays 
d’en haut.  As later British agents had to concede, good relations with the Odawas were 
essential since they were “a Nation much respected by all the others.” 
Id.  
 67.  Id. at 40 (“The Anishinaabeg at Michilimackinac saw no reason for this position and rela-
tionship to end with the coming of the British.”). 
 68.  SLEEPER-SMITH, supra note 56, at 19; see also ROBERT DALE PARKER, THE SOUND THE 
STARS MAKE RUSHING THROUGH THE SKY: THE WRITINGS OF JANE JOHNSTON SCHOOLCRAFT 4 
(2008). 
 69.  WILLIAM W. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE OJIBWAY PEOPLE 173 (1984). 
 70.  SLEEPER-SMITH, supra note 56, at 19.  
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family.  Of course, it was his downfall as well, as he was later forced to resign 
after allegations of nepotism in government appointments came to light.71 
It may appear crass to modern sensibilities that white men who entered 
into kinship relationships with Anishinaabe families often did so in order to 
acquire access to markets and trade routes.  That sensibility dates back cen-
turies; the Jesuits that accompanied the French in the early years of the fur 
trade were “horrified” by these practices.72  But given that Anishinaabe tra-
ditional governance was—and continues to be—heavily based in kinship and 
clan relationships, it made a great deal of sense for outsiders seeking access 
to the Indian market to marry into the market.  In fact, many Indian nations 
believed formal treaties with European and American governments estab-
lished familial relationships between nations.73 
Although non-Indians gained many benefits from establishing relation-
ships with tribes, they acquired duties and responsibilities to their newfound 
kin that were concomitant to their entrance into the family business.  Family 
responsibilities extended beyond merely providing sustenance to close rela-
tives.  Obligations would include defending the larger family from attacks, 
providing resources to a large group of relatives and others who had need, 
enforcing local rules, and helping to hold others accountable for their respon-
sibilities.  These duties parallel modern governmental obligations.  There was 
little tolerance for failure to meet these obligations, and self-dealing or dou-
ble-dealing could be met with swift retribution.74 
Intermarriage was only one way that the Great Lakes Anishinaabeg gov-
erned their hunting and trading territories—Indian people expected compen-
sation for trespass and property damages.  In one notable instance, mission-
aries in what is now the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, invited by fur traders 
in the nineteenth century, faced demands that they enter into agreements to 
compensate local Indians for expanding the facilities at the trading posts or 
face attacks on their own property in retaliation.75  Natives in Waukesha, 
                                                          
 71.  THEODORE J. KARAMANSKI, BLACKBIRD’S SONG: ANDREW J. BLACKBIRD AND THE 
ODAWA PEOPLE 102 (2012). 
 72.  Id. at 16–17. 
 73.  See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN 
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600–1800, at 62–82 (1997). 
 74.  CARY MILLER, OGIMAAG: ANISHINAABEG LEADERSHIP, 1760–1845, at 124–25 (2010); 
see also, e.g., ANTON TREUER, THE ASSASSINATION OF HOLE IN THE DAY (2011) (detailing the life 
of Hole in the Day the Younger, who asserted more power than his tribal community recognized in 
him, and was assassinated). 
 75.  Miller, supra note 74, at 101.  Professor Miller elaborates:  
When fur traders and missionaries in the nineteenth and even early twentieth centuries 
used Anishinaabeg resources without proper compensation, communities reminded them 
of their obligations.  In the 1830s, [at L’Anse,] . . . missionaries, who understood them-
selves as invited into the field by the fur traders, asked only their missionary supervisors, 
the regional Indian agent, and the local fur traders for permission when wishing to add 
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Wisconsin, for example, demanded damages after white settlers allowed their 
cattle to roam free and destroy Indian corn crops; the “Indians being legally 
in possession of the land” required and received compensation in the form of 
a large ox in one instance.76 
In short, non-Indians expecting to reside within Anishinaabeg territories 
and do business with Indian people and Indian nations understood that the 
tribe expected them to comply with tribal customary and traditional law in 
exchange for permission to reside and trade. 
C.  Five Civilized Tribes’ Permitting and Intermarriage Laws 
The so-called Five Civilized Tribes established and codified the most 
detailed and comprehensive tribal regulatory schemes to govern noncitizens 
in nineteenth-century American history.  Other Indian nations located near 
these tribes also adopted similar laws. 
After the removal of the Five Civilized Tribes to Oklahoma, the tribes 
established strict permitting requirements governing noncitizens who wished 
to reside upon, work within, and lease Indian lands, or marry into Indian fam-
ilies.  In Oklahoma Indian country, American citizens wishing to access the 
Indian markets had to acquire a federal Indian trader permit and a tribal per-
mit, and often married into the tribe and acquired tribal citizenship.77  In 
many instances, it appears, white men married Indian women merely to ac-
quire property in Indian country.78 
In the mid-nineteenth century, several Indian nations in and around In-
dian Territory, in what is now the state of Oklahoma, enacted legislation pur-
porting to govern non-Indian activity.79  These Indian nations regulated en-
trance, residence, contracting, and employment by non-Indians with the 
                                                          
on to their facilities at the posts.  This behavior aroused the animosity of the local villages, 
who insisted that the missionaries desist or enter into an agreement with the community.  
When the missionaries ignored repeated warnings to engage in proper reciprocal and 
compensatory behavior, they often jeopardized their own property, especially livestock. 
Id.  
 76.  Alexander F. Pratt, Reminiscences of Wisconsin, in 1 WISC. HIST. COLLECTIONS 127, 135 
(Lyman Copeland Draper ed., State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1903) (1855). 
 77.  E.g., Oliver Knight, An Oklahoma Indian Trader as a Frontiersman of Commerce, 23 J. 
SOUTHERN HIST. 203 (1957) (detailing the life of James J. McAlester, an American citizen who 
traded inside of Choctaw Indian country under a federal license and a tribal permit and acquired 
tribal citizenship by marrying a Choctaw woman). 
 78.  LEUPP, supra note 40, at 345–46. 
 79.  In at least one instance, the Choctaw Nation, the tribe’s removal treaty expressly provided 
that noncitizens must procure a written permit from the tribe or the federal government before con-
ducting business on Choctaw land:   
No person shall expose goods or other article for sale as a trader, without a written permit 
from the constituted authorities of the Nation, or authority of the laws of the Congress of 
the U.S. under penalty of forfeiting the Articles, and the constituted authorities of the 
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tribes.  In 1880 and 1890, Interior Department reports on Indian affairs 
acknowledged these types of permitting statutes.80  Additionally, a 1912 re-
port to Congress on the Five Civilized Tribes noted that the tribes had long 
been issuing employment permits to noncitizens.81  The same report noted 
that tribal courts adjudicated the rights of noncitizens employed in accord-
ance with a permit.82 
The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma is a good example of a tribe restrict-
ing non-Indian activity within its borders.83  Immediately after removal, the 
Cherokee Nation took legislative action in 1839 to strictly regulate noncitizen 
activity on the reservation by initially barring citizens from leasing land to 
noncitizens in 1839.84  From then until the 1880s, the Cherokee Nation con-
tinually enacted laws regulating noncitizen activities, usually restricting 
noncitizen rights to own land.85  In 1843, the Cherokee Nation enacted a per-
mit system similar to that enacted by other Oklahoma tribes in the same pe-
riod.86  The Civil War interrupted enforcement of the intermarriage permit 
system, but the Cherokee Nation moved to reinstate the system in the 1870s.87  
In addition to laws restricting use and ownership of tribal land, the Cherokees 
enacted many stringent regulations on noncitizens wishing to marry tribal 
                                                          
Nation shall grant no license except to such persons as reside in the Nation and are an-
swerable to the laws of the Nation. 
A Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession and Limits, Choctaw-U.S. art. X, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 
333. 
 80.  DEP’T OF INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 91 (1890), 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=article&did=His-
tory.AnnRep90.i0003&id=History.AnnRep90&isize=M (“Each of the five nations has its distinct 
permit system.”); DEP’T OF INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 217 
(1880) (“These nations have a permit system, by which citizens of the nations can employ citizens 
of the United States to labor for them one year by paying a small tax to the national treasurer.  If 
these laborers attend to their own business, and carry out their contract in good faith, they remain 
here for years.”). 
 81.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES IN OKLAHOMA, S. DOC. NO. 1139, at 110 
(3d Sess. 1912) (“The people who thus removed to the Choctaw-Chickasaw country west of the 
Mississippi entered upon the land and made homes thereon, acquired farms, and otherwise im-
proved the country.  To some of them, as the records of the department show, permits were issued 
by the tribal authorities to employ noncitizens.  Thus, the persons receiving such permits were, in 
one way, recognized as citizens.”). 
 82.  Id. at 121 (referencing “people who were accorded school privileges in the Indian nations 
who were granted permits to employ noncitizens and whose rights were adjudicated in the tribal 
courts”). 
 83.  See generally NANCY HOPE SOBER, THE INTRUDERS: THE ILLEGAL RESIDENTS OF THE 
CHEROKEE NATION, 1866–1907 (1991). 
 84.  Id. at 27. 
 85.  Id. at 27–28. 
 86.  Id. at 28; see also supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.  
 87.  Id. at 28–29. 
 2017] TRIBAL JURISDICTION 117 
 
citizens.88  However, by the late decades of the nineteenth century, the Cher-
okee Nation was overrun by intruders as neither the tribe nor the federal gov-
ernment could or would enforce the tribe’s permit laws.89 
The United States Attorney General also addressed the legal conse-
quences of tribal permit systems and acknowledged tribal authority to govern 
nonmembers.  In an 1855 opinion, Attorney General Caleb Cushing reviewed 
the permitting and intermarriage systems established by the Choctaw Na-
tion.90  Around ten years prior, the Supreme Court had decided United States 
v. Rogers,91 which held that a white man who had acquired tribal citizenship 
was not released from federal criminal jurisdiction.92 Cushing disagreed with 
this holding, however, and stated that he would have held that non-Indians 
who acquired tribal citizenship remained subject to tribal civil authority.93 
In the opinion, the Attorney General concluded that the Choctaw tribal 
court (which then had jurisdiction over Chickasaw tribal members) could 
have civil jurisdiction over a white man who had acquired tribal citizenship 
through the permit system.  The opinion’s syllabus concludes: 
[I]n matters of civil jurisdiction, arising within the nation, its courts 
have jurisdiction over a white man who has voluntarily made him-
self a Chicasaw by intermarriage and exercise of all the rights of a 
Chicasaw, and where the question concerns property the proceeds 
of a head-right granted to him as a Chicasaw.94 
The syllabus suggests that tribal jurisdiction over white men is dependent on 
the white man’s adoption by marriage into the Chickasaw Nation, and prop-
erty acquired by white men through a treaty provision. 
The particular white man in question in Cushing’s opinion, Thomas F. 
Cheadle, married a Chickasaw woman before the federal government re-
moved the majority of the Chickasaw and Choctaw people from the southeast 
United States to what is now Oklahoma.95  He acquired property—a Chicka-
saw head-right—in an 1834 treaty, drew a treaty annuity as a Chickasaw 
                                                          
 88.  Id. at 30. 
 89.  Id. at 126–34. 
 90.  Jurisdiction of the Courts of the Choctaw Nation, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 174 (1855). 
 91.  45 U.S. 567 (1846). 
 92.  Id. at 573.  
 93.  7 Op. Att’y Gen. at 185 (“Congress has seen fit to withhold from the Choctaw nation all 
criminal jurisdiction over white men within their territory, but not to withhold from them civil ju-
risdiction over such white men as of their own free will and accord choose to become members of 
the nation.”). 
 94.  Id. at 174–75. 
 95.  Id. at 175 (“Thomas F. Cheadle, represented to be a ‘white man,’—which, if it have any 
pertinent meaning in the case, must mean that he is a man of European race, and a possible citizen 
of the United States, by right of birth or naturalization according to law,—married a Chicasaw 
woman, by whom he had children, previous to the emigration of the Chicasaws from the State of 
Mississippi . . . .”). 
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tribal member, and enjoyed Chickasaw political rights.96  Cheadle and his 
wife eventually sold the property he acquired by virtue of the treaty terms, 
and their children claimed the proceeds.97 
The Choctaw Nation argued that the dispute should be resolved in tribal 
court, but the United States Indian agent opposed that position, arguing that 
he should have exclusive authority to resolve the dispute.98  The Attorney 
General rejected the view of the Indian agent out of hand, labeling the posi-
tion “suicidal,” deeply unsatisfied with the proposition that the President 
should be forced into a position to decide every simple property rights matter 
arising in Indian country.99  That left the tribal court as the proper forum.  The 
critical portion of the opinion of the Attorney General was that no federal or 
state court would have jurisdiction over this uniquely internal question: 
 But there is no provision of treaty, and no statute, which takes 
away from the Choctaws jurisdiction of a case like this, a question 
of property strictly internal to the Choctaw nation; nor is there any 
written law which confers jurisdiction of such a case on any court 
of the United States.  The Agent admits that if the courts of the 
Choctaws have not jurisdiction, the case must depend for its deci-
sion on the executive authorities of the United States.100 
                                                          
 96.  Id. (“[Cheadle] became entitled to a Chicasaw head-right of three sections of land under 
the treaty between the United States and the Chicasaws, of July 1st, 1834;—emigrated with the 
Chicasaws to their present residence in the country of the Choctaws,—draws annuity as a Chicasaw, 
has sued as plaintiff in the Choctaw courts, votes for officers to the General Council, and exercises 
all the other rights of a Chicasaw member of the Choctaw and Chicasaw Union.”). 
 97.  Id. at 176. 
 98.  Id. (“The Choctaw nation think it belongs to their courts: the United States Agent, residing 
with the Choctaws, (Mr. Cooper,) thinks there is no court which has jurisdiction of the matter, and 
that the determination of it belongs in the first instance to him, subject, of course, to the authority 
of his executive chiefs, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the Interior, and the 
President.”). 
 99.  Id. at 179.  Attorney General Cushing declared that the agent, an extension of the executive 
branch, would be constitutionally incapable of adjudicating such a claim:  
Such a conclusion is suicidal.  How shall the President of the United States adjudicate 
upon a mere question of meum and tuum, a right of property, possession, inheritance, 
succession, usufruct, or whatever it may be, in controversy between private individuals 
in the United States?  How shall any subordinate executive agent of his do this?  A judg-
ment or decree of any such executive agent, disposing of any such question, and giving 
title to the successful party, would be a new and strange thing in the jurisprudence of the 
United States. 
Id. 
 100.  Id. at 179. 
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Immediately following this decision, the Attorney General’s views had 
support in a smattering of lower court cases addressing similar issues.101  At-
torney General Cushing effectively validated the permit system as a mecha-
nism by which tribes could assert jurisdiction over nonmembers. 
Often, the Oklahoma Indian nations codified their permit system codes, 
and used the permit system to impose tribal taxes on the commercial activi-
ties of noncitizens and other non-Indians.102  At the height of tribal self-gov-
ernance in mid-nineteenth-century Oklahoma, however, tribal enforcement 
of permitting systems faced federal court challenges to tribal authority.  At 
least one federal court indirectly affirmed the authority of Oklahoma Indian 
nations to enact permitting systems and to enforce them by confiscating and 
selling noncompliant, noncitizen property.  In Hamilton v. United States,103 
the court rejected the claims under an Indian depredation act for dwellings 
seized and sold by the Chickasaw Nation under the tribe’s permitting system.  
The court concluded that the noncitizen had consented to tribal jurisdiction 
by acquiring a permit under tribal law: 
 The claimant by applying for and accepting a license to trade 
with the Chickasaw Indians, and subsequently acquiring property 
within the limits of their reservation, subjected the same to the ju-
risdiction of their laws.  Redress for any infringement of their prop-
erty rights, by national authority, in pursuance of legislative enact-
ment can not be granted in this kind of a proceeding, and the 
petition is dismissed.104 
A second federal court rejected the authority of the Interior Department 
to enforce tribal permitting laws, at least where a treaty expressly excluded 
federally licensed Indian traders from tribal authority over permitting laws, 
as in the 1866 treaty respecting the Choctaws and Chickasaws.105 
                                                          
 101.  See, e.g., Tuten’s Lessee v. Byrd and Welcker, 1 Tenn. 108, 108 (1851) (“For many years 
preceding the treaty of 1817 said Wyly Tuten resided with the Cherokee tribe of Indians, and was 
recognized by them as one of their nation, and as entitled to all the rights and privileges of a native 
Indian.  Under the treaties of 1817 and 1819 he registered his name in the office of the Cherokee 
agent for a life-estate reservation in the section of land sued for in this action.”); United States v. 
Ragsdale, 27 F. Cas. 684, 686 (C.C.D. Ark. 1847) (No. 16,113) (“After adoption [by the Cherokee 
Nation, white men] became members of the community, subject to all the burdens, and entitled to 
all the immunities of native born citizens or subjects; and it is reasonable, in my judgment, to sup-
pose that they were intended to be included in the general amnesty.”).  Though beyond the scope of 
this Article, Cushing’s Opinion has been revived in recent decades by the Supreme Court.  See Nat’l 
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855 (1985).  
 102. A representative survey of these laws is included in an Appendix following this Article.  
See App’x.  
 103.  42 Ct. Cl. 282 (1907). 
 104.  Id. at 287. 
 105.  See Zevely v. Weimer, 82 S.W. 941 (Indian Terr. 1904).  In Zevely v. Weimer, the Court 
of Appeals of Indian Territory stated: 
 120 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:nnn 
 
The Oklahoma Indian nations also levied business and commercial 
taxes on noncitizens, enforcing and collecting those taxes throughout the 
nineteenth century.  The lack of tribal capacity to collect taxes from an over-
whelming number of noncitizens, coupled with some interference from the 
federal government, eventually undermined practical tribal power to assert 
jurisdiction. 
As tribal governance capacity was overwhelmed by noncitizen activity 
in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the Department of Interior did 
begin to assist several tribes in collecting tribal taxes.  In 1900, the report 
from the Commissioner on Indian Affairs to the Interior Secretary noted that 
the Choctaw Nation required noncitizens to pay a tax on “the value of goods 
introduced by them for sale in that nation,” and the Chickasaw Nation re-
quired noncitizens “engaged in business” to pay a tax on “the amount of their 
                                                          
  It thus clearly appears by the treaty of 1855 that the Choctaws and Chickasaws shall 
be secured in the unrestricted right of self-government, and full jurisdiction—where?  
“Within their respective limits.”  They are not to have jurisdiction over noncitizens and 
their property “found within their limits,” and such shall be considered intruders and be 
removed, but an exception to those to be removed are those “trading” therein under li-
cense from the United States; and by the treaty of 1866, art. 39, “No person shall expose 
goods for sale as a trader without a permit of the legislative authorities of the nation he 
proposes to trade in;” the treaty of 1855 being thus modified by the later treaty of 1866 
so that the license shall be granted by the legislative authorities of the nation, instead of 
by the government of the United States.  By the express terms of the treaties, the only 
persons to be removed are the noncitizens “found within their limits,” but “traders” are 
not to expose goods for sale without a permit from the legislative authorities, and are 
expressly excepted from those to be removed.  The appellees, by their own complaint, 
admit that they are traders “without license from the legislative authorities of the nation 
they propose to trade in.”  By article 45 of the treaty of 1866 it is provided: “Art. 45.  All 
the rights, privileges and immunities heretofore possessed by said nations or individuals 
thereof, or to which they were entitled under the treaties and legislation heretofore made 
and had in connection with them shall be, and are hereby declared to be, in full force, so 
far as they are consistent with the provisions of this treaty.”  It seems, therefore, quite 
unnecessary to enter the field of speculation or explore the realms of imagination to dis-
cover by what authority the tribal governments of the Choctaws and Chickasaws fix a 
license fee for traders, or to investigate for precedents for such action, when by express 
terms it is under and by virtue of the power conferred by the aforesaid treaties with the 
government of the United States. 
Id. at 945–46. 
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capital stock invested.”106  The tribes collected their own taxes from nonciti-
zens.107 
The Commissioner also reported that the Creek Nation attempted to im-
pose a tax on national banks within the reservation: “Section 246 of the Laws 
of the Creek Nation provides for a tax on each banking establishment of ‘one-
half of 1 percent of capital stock invested—assessment to be made on the 
bank on account of the shares thereof.’”108  The Indian agent asked for an 
opinion on whether federal bank regulations precluded the tax on the bank, 
and the Comptroller of the Currency answered that the tax likely was 
preempted but could still be imposed on the stock of the bank.109 
In the late 1890s and early 1900s, as the United States terminated the 
tribal justice systems of the Five Civilized Tribes and took significant control 
over those tribal governments, the Interior Department began to assist the 
tribes in enforcing tribal permit laws and taxation ordinances.  In significant 
cases such as Morris v. Hitchcock,110 where the Supreme Court affirmed 
Choctaw and Interior Department regulations providing for enforcement of 
the tribal taxes on licensed Indian traders, and Buster v. Wright,111 holding 
the same in relation to Creek laws, courts affirmed the practice of allowing 
the Interior Department to enforce tribal laws in the absence of tribal courts. 
D.  Intruders 
Numerous Indian treaties anticipated and dealt with the problem of non-
Indian or nonmember Indian intruders on reservation lands.  There was no 
uniformity in the treaties regarding enforcement mechanisms.  Some treaties 
                                                          
 106.  DEP’T OF INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 137–38 (1900), 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?id=History.AnnRep1900p1.  The re-
port provided:  
The laws of the Choctaw Nation provide that noncitizens shall pay a tax of 1 1/2 per cent 
on the value of goods introduced by them for sale in that nation, and the Chickasaw laws 
require that noncitizens engaged in business in the Chickasaw Nation shall pay a tax of 
1 per cent on the amount of their capital stock invested. . . .  [T]he Government has never 
collected any of the rents, royalties, or taxes in the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations ac-
cruing by reason of noncitizens being engaged in business within the limits of said na-
tions, except the royalty on coal and asphalt.  All other taxes, royalties, and rents have 
been collected by the national collectors of those nations. 
Id.  
 107.  Id. at 138. 
 108.  Id. at 140 (quoting CREEK LAWS (1893 ed.)). 
 109.  Id. at 141 (“While . . . it would seem that the Chickasaw Nation would be precluded, under 
the statutes of the United States, from imposing a permit tax on national banks within that nation, 
the said nation may impose a tax upon the stock of the bank held by individuals and require the 
bank to pay the same, unless there be banks established under the authority of the laws of the nation 
which are taxed upon their capital stock.”). 
 110.  194 U.S. 384 (1904). 
 111.  135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906). 
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required the United States to enforce the reservation boundaries and expel 
intruders.112  Some presumed tribal assistance with intruder expulsion.  Other 
treaties provided that intruders had given up their American legal protections 
and left their fate to tribal law. 
Typical treaty provisions dealing with intruders, however, left incom-
plete the enforcement provisions and simply barred nonmembers from en-
trance absent tribal consent, such as Article 7 of the Treaty with the Sacs and 
Foxes.113  The several “Stevens treaties,” named after the American treaty 
negotiator Isaac Stevens, contained similar provisions.  One example is the 
Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Treaty with the Nez Percés.114  Other treaty 
                                                          
 112.  See, e.g., Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws art. 7, June 22, 1855, 11 Stat. 611.  
The intruder provision stipulates: 
So far as may be compatible with the constitution of the United States and the laws made 
in pursuance thereof, regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, the Choc-
taws and Chickasaws shall be secured in the unrestricted right of self-government, and 
full jurisdiction, over persons and property, within their respective limits; excepting, 
however, all persons with their property, who are not by birth, adoption, or otherwise 
citizens or members of either the Choctaw or Chickasaw tribe, and all persons, not being 
citizens or members of either tribe, found within their limits, shall be considered intrud-
ers, and be removed from, and kept out of the same, by the United States agent, assisted 
if necessary by the military . . . .,  
Id.  Relatedly, two Presidential Proclamations gave authority to the military to remove early settlers 
within the Indian Territory.  Proclamation No. 243, 21 Stat. 797 (April 26, 1879) (Settling in the 
Indian Territory); Proclamation No. 246, 21 Stat. 798 (Feb. 12, 1880) (Settling in the Indian Terri-
tory).  Later, Congress would appropriate $15,000–$20,000 each year “[f]or the purpose of remov-
ing intruders and placing allottees in unrestricted possession of their allotments.”  See Act of Mar. 
1, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-154, 34 Stat. 1015, 1025; see also Act of June 21, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-
258, 34 Stat. 325, 325; Act of Mar. 1, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-154, 34 Stat. 1015, 1015; Act of Apr. 
30, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-104, 35 Stat. 70, 70.  
 113.  Treaty with the Sacs, Foxes, Iowas art. VII, Mar. 6, 1861, 12 Stat. 1171.  The Article pro-
vides:  
No person not a member of either of the tribes, parties to this convention, shall go upon 
the reservations or sojourn among the Indians without a license or written permit from 
the agent or superintendent of Indian affairs, except Government employees or persons 
connected with the public service.  And no mixed-blood Indians, except those employed 
at some mission, or such as may be sent there to be educated, or other members of the 
aforesaid tribes, shall participate in the beneficial provisions of this agreement or former 
treaties, unless they return to and unite permanently with said tribes, and reside upon the 
respective reservations within six months from the date of this convention. 
Id.  This provision can also be found, slightly altered, in an earlier treaty with the Sacs and Foxes: 
“If any citizen of the United States or other white person should form a settlement upon lands which 
are the property of the Sac and Fox tribes, upon complaint being made thereof to the superintendent 
or other person having charge of the affairs of the Indians, such intruder shall forthwith be re-
moved.”  Treaty with the Sacs and Foxes art. 6, Nov. 3, 1804, 7 Stat. 84). 
 114.  Treaty with the Nez Percés art. II, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957, 958.  That paragraph pro-
vides: 
  All which tract shall be set apart, and, so far as necessary, surveyed and marked out 
for the exclusive use and benefit of said tribe as an Indian reservation.  Nor shall any 
white man, excepting those in the employment of the Indian department, be permitted to 
reside upon the said reservation without permission of the tribe and the superintendent 
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provisions failed to specify both the requirement of tribal consent and the 
enforcement mechanism, only broadly and in passive voice referring to the 
required removal of intruders from Indian territory.115 
Treaty provisions dealing with the problem of intruders highlight the 
status of Indian tribes as both sovereigns and property owners, and that tribes 
retained a kind of plenary authority over tribal lands.  A property owner re-
taining sovereignty, like an Indian tribe, inherently possesses the power to 
regulate all persons within its jurisdiction.  Persons entering tribal lands 
would need to bargain for permission to enter and, usually as a result of that 
bargain, accept tribal control.  Tribes likely intended the intruder provisions 
to require the federal government to assist tribes in enforcing that regime. 
II.  IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN TRIBAL JURISDICTION 
The twenty-first-century experience of Indian nations and the nonmem-
bers that permeate their lands is not radically different than the nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century experience.  Indian nations still jealously guard 
their economic assets and nonmembers still must bargain for entrance into 
the tribal economic markets.  The substance of tribal economies, however, 
has changed dramatically as on-reservation economic activity has shifted 
from a more subsistence-type economic culture to economies based on gov-
ernment, service, tourism, entertainment, and natural resource extraction.  
Nonmembers must still bargain for and make concessions to access these 
tribal markets. 
The sheer number of nonmembers that have already consented, ex-
pressly or impliedly, to tribal jurisdiction is also unprecedented in American 
Indian history.  It is now routine for nonmembers to pay tribal taxes,116 be 
                                                          
and agent.  And the said confederated tribe agrees to remove to and settle upon the same 
within one year after the ratification of this treaty. 
Id.; see also Treaty with the Flatheads art. II, July 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975, 976 (“Nor shall any white 
man, excepting those in the employment of the Indian department, be permitted to reside upon the 
said reservation without permission of the confederated tribes, and the superintendent and agent.”); 
Treaty with the Qui-nai-elts art. II, July 1, 1855 & Jan. 25, 1856, 12 Stat. 971, 971 (providing that 
“no white man shall be permitted to reside thereon without permission of the tribe and of the super-
intendent of Indian affairs or Indian agent”); Treaty with the Makah Tribe, Makah-U.S. art. II, Jan. 
31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939 (same); Treaty with the S’Klallams, Sklallams-U.S. art. II, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 
Stat. 933, 934 (same); Treaty with the Nisquallys art. II, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133 (same).  
 115.  See A Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession and Limits, Choctaw-U.S. art. X, Sept. 27, 
1830, 7 Stat. 333. (“All intruders shall be removed from the Choctaw Nation and kept without it.”).  
 116.  Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 139–41 (1982); Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).  
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haled into tribal court in civil cases,117 to sue in tribal court,118 and even serve 
on tribal court juries.119  Tribal governance over Indian lands has expanded 
dramatically as the federal government has grown to support and encourage 
                                                          
 117.  See, e.g., One Thousand Four Hundred Sixty Three Dollars v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 
9 Okla. Trib. 83 (Muscogee (Creek) 2005) (holding tribal court was the correct forum for civil 
forfeiture proceedings involving non-Indians’ illegal drug use and distribution in casino parking 
lot); Wolf Point Org. v. Investment Centers of America, Inc., 3 Am. Tribal Law 290 (Fort Peck Ct. 
App. 2001) (holding tribal court was the correct forum for a dispute involving a non-Indian invest-
ment company operating on the reservation). 
 118.  Due to their perceived deep pockets, tribes with casinos often attract slip-and-fall cases to 
their tribal courts.  See, e.g., Lefevre v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 23 Ind. L. Rep. 6018 (Mash. 
Peq. Tr. Ct. 1992) (deciding a slip and fall case at the Tribe’s bingo hall as the first case heard by 
the Tribal Court).  Non-Indians bring numerous other types of claims, as well.  See Neptune Leasing, 
Inc. v. Mountain States Petroleum Corp., 11 Am. Tribal Law 162 (Navajo 2013) (breach of payment 
plan); Marathon Oil Co. v. Johnston, 33 Ind. L. Rep. 6095 (Shoshone & Arapaho Ct. App. 2006) 
(negligence suit against employer for injuries suffered in the scope of employment); Mustang Fuel 
Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tax Com’n, 4 Okla. Trib. 1 (Cheyenne-Arapaho 1994) (challenge to 
Tribe’s ability to tax entities on allotted lands); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Supreme Court Case Could 
Expose Indian Tribes to New Legal Risks, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 13, 2016, 8:40 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/supreme-court-case-could-expose-indian-tribes-to-new-legal-risks-
66728 (noting there are many suits brought by nonmembers in tribal courts to reach tribal coffers). 
 119.  Tribal courts have altered their tribal codes to include non-Indians within jury pools in 
order to fulfil the requirement under the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 that 
juries must represent a “fair cross section of the community,” tribal courts have altered their tribal 
codes to include non-Indians within jury pools.  Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 204(d)(3)(A), 127 Stat. 54, 
122 (2013) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701–14040); see also FORT PECK TRIBES 
COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE, tit. 6, ch. 5 § 507(b)(1), (c)–(d) (2015) (requiring the juror list 
for special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction to include twenty-one tribal members and 
twenty-one nontribal members, randomly summoning twelve individuals and choosing six); 
PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE, tit. 3, ch. 2-1 § 160 (2016) (pulling potential jurors from tribal mem-
bers, individuals living in tribal housing, and anyone working for the tribe); TULALIP TRIBAL 
CODES, ch. 2.05, § 110 (2017) (creating a potential juror list from tribal members and employees 
of the tribe or “any of its enterprises, agencies, subdivisions or instrumentalities”); CONFEDERATED 
TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA INDIAN RESERVATION, CRIMINAL CODE AND PROCEDURES, ch. 3, § 
3.19 (2014) (using county voter registration lists to find and summon potential jurors from any 
resident of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, regardless of tribal membership).  
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tribal self-determination,120 replacing the remaining whispers of federal and 
state government authority over Indian lands.121 
There has been a similar dramatic shift in Indian country land ownership 
patterns, originating from the allotment era of federal Indian affairs.122  Alt-
hough many tribes were affected by allotment practices decades earlier,123 
allotment policies occurred in full force from 1887 to 1934.124  During this 
period, the United States opened up dozens of communally owned Indian 
                                                          
 120.  The executive and legislative branches’ movements towards accepting and furthering tribal 
self-determination are credited as beginning with President Lyndon B. Johnson.  Lyndon B. John-
son, President, The Forgotten American: The President’s Message to the Congress on Goals and 
Programs for the American Indian (Mar. 6, 1968), in 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 438, 448 (“We 
must affirm the right of the first Americans to remain Indians while exercising their rights as Amer-
icans.  We must affirm their right to freedom of choice and self-determination.”).  In the ensuing 
fifty decades, tribal self-determination has increased exponentially through the passage of acts such 
as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 
Stat. 2203 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.), the Indian Child Welfare Act, 
Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1901–63 (2016)), the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 
1996, 1996a (2016)), and the HEARTH Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-151, 126 Stat. 1150 (amend-
ing 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2016)), among many others. 
 121.  The federal and state governments have often extended their jurisdiction into Indian coun-
try under the guise of concurrent jurisdiction.  But because of a lack of funding or political will by 
states, no one exercises adequate governance over Indian country.  Cf. United States v. Bryant, 136 
S. Ct. 1954, 1960 (2016) (“Even when capable of exercising jurisdiction, however, States have not 
devoted their limited criminal justice resources to crimes committed in Indian country.”); see also, 
e.g., Joseph A. Myers & Elbridge Coochise, Development of Tribal Courts: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 79 JUDICATURE 147, 148–49 (1995) (offering an early overview of the lack of funds appro-
priated for tribal courts and Indian country justice systems).  In the 1953 hearings on Public Law 
83-280, Congress debated appropriating more funding for the additional police and court work re-
quired by states but chose to follow the Department of the Interior’s recommendation not to.  Bryan 
v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 381–83 (1976) (citing Unpublished Transcript of Hearings on H.R. 
1063 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953)). 
 122.  The changes in land ownership because of allotment were contemplated by the Supreme 
Court as early as 1896.  Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 246 (1896).  See generally KRISTIN 
T. RUPPEL, UNEARTHING INDIAN LAND: LIVING WITH THE LEGACIES OF ALLOTMENT (2008); Ju-
dith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995). 
 123.  Earlier approaches to allotment occurred through piecemeal treaties and special acts but 
encompassed a broad number of parcels.  In the one year prior to the beginning of the formal allot-
ment era, 7,673 separate allotments were made.  DEP’T OF INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 411 (1886), http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/His-
tory/History-idx?id=History.AnnRep86.  In 1885, at minimum 6,537 allotments were made.  DEP’T 
OF INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 355 (1885), http://digicoll.li-
brary.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=header&id=History.AnnRep85&isize=M.  
 124.  These dates are bounded by the 1887 passage of the Dawes Act, also known as the General 
Allotment Act, Pub. L. No. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388, and the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984.  During the middle of this period, Congress passed the 
Burke Act of 1906, which allowed the Secretary to take allotments out of trust status prior to the 
required twenty-five years proscribed by the Dawes Act, opening the land up to unscrupulous non-
Indian land collectors.  Pub. L. No. 5-149, 34 Stat. 182 (1906).  
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reservations to non-Indian ownership.125  Indian country on those reserva-
tions is now heavily checkerboarded with Indian nations, tribal members, 
nonmembers, and non-tribal governments owning and controlling large 
swaths of former Indian reservation lands.126  Somewhat similarly, landless 
tribes have benefitted from the Interior Secretary’s acquisition of land in trust 
for Indian nations and individual Indians,127 but almost by definition those 
trust lands created more checkerboarding, as the trust lands are islands of 
tribal and federal jurisdiction surrounded by state and local jurisdiction.  For 
purposes of this Section of the Article, we will use the term “Indian lands” to 
mean lands that remain in reservation or trust status, and other lands over 
which Indian nations retain the power to exclude. 
A. Modern Bargains 
Nonmembers in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have 
integrated themselves into tribal communities in ways that are largely analo-
gous to the ways nonmembers entered tribal communities in the pre-modern 
era.128  For the most part, what has changed is not how nonmembers enter 
tribal economic, political, and legal arenas, but instead how tribal govern-
ments have changed and adapted to the modern world. 
The United States formally supported the development of tribal govern-
ance for much of the twentieth century after the enactment of the Indian Re-
organization Act in 1934,129 excepting the so-called Termination Era of the 
1950s where Congress eliminated the federal relationship with hundreds of 
                                                          
 125.  The Dawes Act included a provision allowing surplus land, land existing after all tribal 
members had received allotments, to be sold to non-Indians.  Dawes Act, § 5, 24 Stat. at 389–90. 
 126.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2012 ed.).  
 127.  25 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012); 25 C.F.R. § 151.1–.3 (2011).  
 128.  We are not referring here to nonmembers that enter Indian lands passing signs stating that 
they expressly consent to tribal jurisdiction by doing so, say at reservation boundaries or tribal ca-
sino entrances, though surely an argument can be made that a tribe may exercise some form of 
jurisdiction over these nominal non-consenters. 
 129.  Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5123 (2016)).  The 
Indian Reorganization Act outlined procedures whereby tribes could formally enact constitutions, 
bylaws, and business charters.  While this indicated support by the United States for independent 
tribal governments, the questionable adoption voting practices, the necessity of Secretary approval 
of any constitution, and model constitutions all emphasize the culture of paternalism directed toward 
Indian peoples at that time.  See id. 
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tribes.130  Federal support for tribal governance began in earnest with the for-
mal beginning of the tribal self-determination era in the 1970s,131 with the 
federal government authorizing tribal governments to administer most fed-
eral programs benefitting tribal interests.  In the 1980s and 1990s, many In-
dian nations’ economic activities expanded dramatically with federal sup-
port,132 allowing tribal governments more resources to provide services to 
Indian country residents, including members and nonmembers, and to govern 
Indian lands. 
The following subsections describe nonmember activities on modern 
Indian reservations and how tribal jurisdiction over those nonmembers is 
triggered. 
1. Employment of Nonmembers on Indian Lands 
The rise of tribal government bureaucracies beginning in the 1970s and 
continuing to today means that tribal governments have created thousands of 
jobs, and have needed to hire thousands and thousands of members and non-
members.  There are 567 federally recognized Indian nations, each employ-
ing anywhere from a few dozen to several thousand tribal employees.133  As 
                                                          
 130.  See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d. Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953) (“That it is declared to be the 
sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and the individual mem-
bers thereof located within the States of California, Florida, New York, and Texas, and all of the 
following named Indian tribes and individual members thereof, should be freed from Federal su-
pervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians: The 
Flathead Tribe of Montana, the Klamath Tribe of Oregon, the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, the 
Potowatamie Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, and those members of the Chippewa Tribe who are on 
the Turtle Mountain Reservation, North Dakota.”). 
 131.  See supra note 120.  
 132.  See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 217–18 (1987); 
Oversight Hearing on Economic Development: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 
105th Cong. (1998) (containing the statements of numerous tribal leaders detailing the economic 
growth in their communities in the prior two decades often resulting from federal financial and 
political encouragement).  The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, for example, estimated a 
growth in their economy from $1 million to $300 million between 1979 and 1998, including the 
creation of 6,000 new jobs during that time.  Id. at 5, 7 (statement of Phillip Martin, Chief, Missis-
sippi Band of Choctaw Indians, Philadelphia, MS).  
 133.  The Navajo Nation employs over 8,000 employees within the tribal government alone.  
NAVAJO NATION, 2009–2010 COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 121 tbl.22 
(2010), http://www.navajobusiness.com/pdf/CEDS/CED_NN_Final_09_10.pdf.  Conversely, sev-
eral tribal governments employ only a handful of individuals to run their tribal government.  LAURA 
E. EVANS, POWER FROM POWERLESSNESS: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONAL NICHES, AND 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2011) (offering a detailed review of twelve tribal governments, varying 
in population, geographic, and economic sizes).  For more information on how the makeup of tribal 
governments can influence tribal economic activities, see Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Re-
loading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Economic Development on American Indian Reser-
vations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992), and Stephen Cornell & 
Joseph P. Kalt, Where’s the Glue? Institutional and Cultural Foundations of American Indian Eco-
nomic Development, 29 J. SOCIO-ECON. 443 (2000). 
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in any municipal-type government, the skill and education level of the em-
ployees range from maintenance workers to doctors and lawyers.  Large 
numbers of tribal government employees are nonmembers.134 
The rise of Indian gaming beginning in the 1980s135 coupled with 
greater tribal control over natural resource extraction industries and the over-
all rise in tribal business activity, tribal enterprises also employ thousands 
upon thousands of employees.136  Some tribal enterprises are very small and 
employ mostly tribal members.  The larger the tribal enterprise, however, the 
larger the number of nonmembers that are employed.137  As with tribal gov-
ernment employment, large numbers of tribal enterprise employees are non-
members.  In many large tribal gaming and natural resource enterprises, non-
member employees significantly outnumber tribal member employees.138 
Tribal employment is always located on Indian lands, reservation or 
trust lands owned or controlled by the tribal government.  Management-level 
employees usually have executed an employment contract with the tribal 
government or enterprise.  Other employment is governed by employee man-
uals and handbooks that provide for dispute resolution and employment sep-
aration procedures.139  Several tribes, and the number is growing, have en-
tered into collective bargaining agreements with employees under tribal labor 
ordinances.140 
                                                          
 134.  One estimate is that 450,000 nonmembers work for Indian gaming operations alone. 161 
CONG. REC. H8,261 (Nov. 17, 2015) (“It should be noted that some 600,000 workers are employed 
in tribal casinos, but fully 75 percent are not members of tribes.”). 
 135.  Tribal gaming revenue now exceeds $28 billion dollars annually.  NIGC Tribal Gaming 
Revenues by Gaming Operation Revenue Range, NAT’L INDIAN GAMING COMM. (2014), 
http://www.nigc.gov/images/uploads/reports/2014GGRbyGamingOperationRevenueRange.pdf. 
 136.  See supra note 134. 
 137.  In 1998, California Indian casinos alone employed nearly 15,000 individuals, ninety per-
cent of whom were non-Indian.  NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM., NATIONAL GAMBLING 
IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 7–9 (1999) . 
 138.  See supra note 134. 
 139.  See, e.g., COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES, EMPLOYEE’S HANDBOOK 25–29 (2010); 
SITKA TRIBE OF ALASKA, EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 27–30 (2013); STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE COMM., 
EMPLOYEE MANUAL 45–49, http://mohican-nsn.gov/mt-content/uploads/2015/11/stock bridge-
munsee-employee-manual.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
 140.  For examples of tribal labor ordinances, see PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM TRIBAL CODE § 
27.03.06 (2011); MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS tit. 32 (2014); COQUILLE INDIAN 
TRIBAL CODE ch. 240 (2008).  At least two circuit courts have applied the National Labor Relations 
Act to Indian-owned businesses.  See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 
(D.C. Cir. 2007); NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537 (6th 
Cir. 2015).  Tribal businesses have become increasingly hostile toward to courts’ application of the 
National Labor Relations Act—so much so that lawmakers have introduced the Tribal Labor Sov-
ereignty Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives in November 2015.  H.R. 511, 
114th Cong. (2015).  The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs has repeatedly recommended that 
the bill be passed, see S. REP. NO. 114-140 (2015) and S. REP. 115-3 (2017), but it has yet to be 
voted on by the full Senate.  S. 63, 115th Cong. (2017).  
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In many regions, tribal governments and enterprises are the largest em-
ployers and the key generators of regional economic activity.141 
2.  Tribal Vendors 
Tribal governments and tribal enterprises depend heavily on outside 
vendors to supply tribal activities.  Indian nations execute dozens or even 
hundreds of agreements each year with office suppliers, investment portfolio 
managers, slot machine technicians, and an incredibly wide variety of other 
vendors.  These agreements commonly require the outside vendor to obtain 
a tribal business license and may require the vendor to consent to tribal laws 
and judicial jurisdiction.142  Tribal contractors typically must comply with 
tribal hiring laws as well, which are often enforced by the tribal employment 
rights offices established by tribes to enforce Indian preference in employ-
ment and contracting laws.143 
3. Tribal Lessees 
Indian nations also execute leases with a large number of nonmember 
individuals and business interests.  As Indian nations have been doing for 
over a century, they have executed leases of tribal lands for agricultural and 
natural resource extraction purposes.  Pre-modern era lessees were usually 
accountable to the Department of Interior as the trustee of tribal assets.144  In 
recent decades, tribal governments have taken greater and greater control 
over these nonmember lessees, requiring lessees to obtain business licenses, 
comply with tribal laws, and consent to tribal judicial jurisdiction.145 
                                                          
 141.  See BEACON ECONOMICS, 2014 CALIFORNIA TRIBAL GAMING IMPACT STUDY: AN 
UPDATED ANALYSIS OF TRIBAL GAMING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS, WITH EXPANDED 
STUDY OF RSTF AND CHARITABLE EFFECTS (2014); JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPACT OF TRIBAL GAMING IN ARIZONA (2014); JONATHAN B. TAYLOR, THE ECONOMIC AND 
FISCAL IMPACTS OF INDIAN TRIBES IN WASHINGTON (2012); Katherine Spilde & Jonathan B. Tay-
lor, Economic Evidence on the Effects of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act on Indians and Non-
Indians, 17 UNLV GAMING RES. & REV. J. 13 (2013); William N. Evans & Julie H. Topoleski, The 
Social and Economic Impact of Native American Casinos (NBER, Working Paper No. 9198, 2002). 
 142.  Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Michael Coccaro, Negotiating with a Tribe or Tribal Entity: 
Practical Tips for Franchisors, 34 FRANCHISE L.J. 34, 47 (2014). 
 143.  See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance, OGLALA SIOUX TRIBE LAW 
AND ORDER CODE ch. 18 (2002); Seneca Nation of Indians Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance 
(2012), https://sni.org/media/145335/sa-adm-prt014121615380.pdf; Comanche Tribal Employ-
ment Rights Ordinance (1995), http://www.comanchena-
tion.com/forms/TERO%20Ordinance%2095.pdf. 
 144.  Under the terms of the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, almost all leases of tribal trust lands 
need to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior before they become effective.  See 25 U.S.C. § 
415(a) (2016). 
 145.  The HEARTH Act of 2012 allows tribal governments to codify tribal leasing regulations, 
leases executed under these new regulations do not require approval from the Secretary of the Inte-
rior.  See generally Pub. L. No. 112-151, 126 Stat. 1150 (amending 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2016)).  Other, 
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A large number of Indian nations also allow nonmembers to enter into 
leases for Indian housing, often when those nonmembers are caring for tribal 
member children or have married tribal members.146  Tribal housing regula-
tions are rigorous, beginning with the application process,147 which makes it 
impossible for a nonmember to be unaware, or refuse to consent to tribal 
jurisdiction. 
4. Tribal Patrons 
Tribal enterprises depend heavily on nonmember customers in gaming, 
service, and tourism industries.  Millions of nonmembers enter Indian lands 
to play casino games,148 buy gasoline or tobacco, and stay at tribal resorts.  
These nonmembers pay tribal excise, sales, use, and other taxes and fees 
without question.149  Nonmembers that stay at tribal resorts likely have signed 
documents in which they expressly consent to tribal jurisdiction.  Numerous 
Indian nations have also begun to enforce civil offense ordinances against 
non-Indians,150 often with cooperation from state and federal authorities. 
5. Tribal Government Service Recipients 
As tribal resources increase, more and more Indian nations are provid-
ing governmental services to nonmembers.  Numerous tribes have public 
                                                          
non-HEARTH Act land use policies also exist.  The Fort Peck Tribes, for example, have adopted a 
comprehensive land use policy that outlines requirements for the major types of land leases, includ-
ing agricultural, business, homesites, and rights of way.  FORT PECK, TRIBES LAND USE POLICY 
(2013). 
 146.  Tribal housing built and managed with block grant funds received under the Native Amer-
ican Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA) can be restricted to Indian fam-
ilies under an exception to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  25 U.S.C. § 4101 (2012).   
 147.  For example, while the Colville Indian Housing Authority only accepts applications from 
tribal members, all household members over the age of eighteen are required to sign the application.  
Memorandum from the Occupancy Specialist I, Colville Indian Housing Auth., to Applicant, 
http://colville.whydevelop.com/media/files/RENTAL%20ASSISTANCE%20APP.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2017). 
 148.  A report from the American Gaming Association in 2000 estimated that almost 8 million 
adults visited casinos on Indian reservations.  AM. GAMING ASS’N, STATE OF THE STATES: THE 
AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT 21 (2001), https://www.americangaming.org/sites/de-
fault/files/research_files/aga-sos-2001.pdf.  This number continues to increase.  In 2007, the state 
of Minnesota alone recorded 17.22 million visits by non-Indians to tribal casinos.  See BARRY 
RYAN, THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF MINNESOTA TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS IN 2007 (2009), 
http://www.mnindiangamingassoc.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/06/MIGA_RYAN_REPORT_ON_EC_IMPACT_2009.pdf. 
 149.  These tribal taxes were upheld by the Supreme Court in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe 
of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).  
 150.  See, e.g., POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS CODE OF OFFENSES, CIVIL 
OFFENSES § 2, http://www.pokagon.com/government/codes-and-ordinances (follow “Code of Of-
fenses” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
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safety cooperative agreements that require tribal police, ambulance, and fire-
fighting assets to respond to nonmember calls for assistance.151  Many tribes 
have also established health clinics that serve nonmembers as well as mem-
bers.152  As noted above, nonmembers also live in tribal housing and, as a 
result, may partake in services provided to renters and lessees.  Finally, tribal 
governments provide a panoply of government services to all persons within 
their jurisdictions, as any municipal government does, from animal control153 
to snow plowing154 to zoning and land use regulation.155 
6.  Tribal Investment Partners 
The rise of tribal business enterprises has allowed Indian nations to part-
ner with investors on a wide variety of commercial activity.  Many Indian 
nations contract with gaming management companies to operate Indian gam-
ing facilities, as provided for and governed by the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act.156  Tribes have also invested in business operations all over the world.157  
The contracts between tribes and their business partners occasionally provide 
                                                          
 151.  See CAROLE GOLDBERG & HEATHER VALDEZ, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280, at 18–37, 113–73 (2007), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222585.pdf (discussing the prevalence and effectiveness 
of cooperative and cross-deputization agreements within Public Law 280 states); Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher et al., Indian Country Law Enforcement and Cooperative Public Safety Agreements, 89 
MICH. B.J. 42 (2010) (detailing public safety cooperative and cross-deputization agreements within 
Michigan).  
 152.  Tribal clinics located in small, rural communities may choose to extend care to non-tribal 
members.  Often, this care is extended to non-Indian women pregnant with the child of a tribal 
member, or nonmembers living in a home where the head of the household is a tribal member, such 
as step children.  E.g. SILETZ TRIBAL HEALTH DEP’T, CONTRACT HEALTH SERVICE (CHS) USERS 
GUIDE 2, http://www.ctsi.nsn.us/uploads/downloads/Clinic/Contract_Health_User_Guide.pdf; 
ALASKA NATIVE MED. CTR., ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE DIRECT HEALTH SERVICES AT ANMC 
POLICY # 703E, at 2–3, http://anmc.org/files/703E.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).  Any tribal clinic 
operated under a block contract grant for IHS services may only serve tribal members or descend-
ants.  INDIAN HEALTH SERV. INDIAN HEALTH MANUAL § 2-1.2, 
https://www.ihs.gov/IHM/index.cfm? module=dsp_ihm_pc_p2c1#2-1.1 (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
 153.  E.g., Lac du Flambeau Animal Control Ordinance, LAC DU FLAMBEAU TRIBAL 
ORDINANCES, ch. 50 (2007); Animal Control, PASCUA YAQUI REGULATORY CODE, pt. VI, ch. 6-1 
(2016), http://www.pascuayaqui-nsn.gov/_static_pages/tribalcodes/ (follow “Ch 6-1 Animal Con-
trol”); UTE INDIAN ANIMAL CONTROL CODE, tit. IX (1988).  
 154.  NAT’L COOPERATIVE HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, TRIBAL TRANS. PROGRAMS: A 
SYNTHESIS OF HIGHWAY PRACTICE 93 (2007). 
 155.  The Supreme Court, however, has made it decidedly more difficult for tribes to control 
zoning within their reservations.  See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian 
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).  
 156.  25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012). 
 157.  For example, the Seminole Tribe of Florida owns the Hard Rock brand of cafes, hotels, 
and casinos.  Seminole Ownership, HARD ROCK, http://www.hardrock.com/corporate/owner-
ship.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).  
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for tribal court jurisdiction over disputes, and almost always require tribal 
business partners to comply with relevant tribal laws.158 
Millions of nonmembers access the tribal market in some manner, from 
employment to gaming to contracting. In each of those arrangements, non-
members have expressly or impliedly consented to tribal laws in some form 
or another.  These nonmembers are on Indian lands for only two fundamental 
reasons–either they have family relationships with tribal members159 or they 
have bargained in some way to access the tribal commercial market. 
B.  Normalizing Tribal Civil Jurisdiction 
On Indian lands, where tribal governance authority is at its zenith, non-
members have voluntarily entered tribal jurisdiction.  At one time, the Su-
preme Court stated that tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers in such cir-
cumstances was “presumptive.”160  Later, the Court backed away from that 
statement, suggesting that tribal civil jurisdiction is an “open question.”161  
Nevertheless, the long history of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers where 
nonmembers bargain for access to tribal markets, continuing with the mil-
lions of nonmembers who voluntarily enter tribal markets today, supports 
presumptive tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. 
Nonconsenting nonmembers that object to tribal court jurisdiction after 
accessing the tribal market are rare.  Given the sheer numbers of nonmembers 
expressly or implicitly consenting on any given day to tribal jurisdiction, the 
small number of tribal and federal court challenges to tribal jurisdiction indi-
cates the rarity of nonconsenting nonmembers.  Nonconsenting nonmembers 
are outliers. 
C . Land Ownership 
Indian lands, as we have used that term in this Article, constitute the 
core of tribal territorial authority.  Indian nations retain the power of exclu-
sion on Indian lands.162  The power to exclude, the Supreme Court has held, 
                                                          
 158.  The dispute over tribal court jurisdiction in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians, for example, involved fairly standard lease documents wherein the nonmember 
company agreed to comply with tribal laws.  J. App. at 45, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (No. 13-1496), 2015 WL 5139328. 
 159.  See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe et al. at 
*10 n.3, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (No. 88-6546) (noting the prevalence of intermarriage 
between members of different tribes, up to seventy percent in some cases).  
 160.  Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (“Civil jurisdiction over [nonmem-
bers’] activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific 
treaty provision or federal statute.”). 
 161.  Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 (2001) (“We leave open the question of tribal-
court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.”). 
 162.  Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). 
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also includes the concomitant power to impose conditions on those that enter 
Indian lands.163  In recent tribal jurisdiction cases, the Court has also stated 
that land ownership is an important, if not dispositive, factor in determining 
whether tribes may assert jurisdiction over nonmember activities.164 
Indian lands are where most tribal commercial activity takes place.  
Tribal natural resources and other fixed assets are located on Indian lands.  
Tribal entertainment and tourism industries are located on Indian lands.  In-
dividual tribal members also live and work there and are a customer base for 
nonmember owned businesses located on Indian lands.  Outside of intimate 
personal relationships, the only reason for nonmembers to enter and stay on 
Indian lands is to access tribal commercial markets. 
Indian lands are also where state jurisdiction is most limited.  Unless 
clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary exists, states have no 
regulatory authority on Indian lands.165  States may tax nonmember activi-
ties,166 and state courts are open to on-reservation civil disputes in states gov-
erned by Public Law 280,167 but that is the extent of state civil jurisdiction on 
Indian lands.  The absence of state regulatory authority on Indian lands pro-
motes tribal commercial activities by allowing tribal governments to be more 
flexible with their own regulations and to craft regulations to encourage non-
member businesses to relocate and expand onto Indian lands. 
Finally, Indian lands are what remain of Indian homelands.168  The bleak 
history of American Indian affairs has meant the dispossession of the vast 
                                                          
 163.  Id. at 144 (“Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe’s 
power to exclude them.  This power necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on 
entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct, such as a tax on business activities con-
ducted on the reservation.”).  
 164.  Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360 (“The ownership status of land, in other words, is only one factor 
to consider in determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to pro-
tect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.’  It may sometimes be a dispositive fac-
tor.” (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)). 
 165.  See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 649 (1993); Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 
373 (1976).  
 166.  See Nathan Quigley, Defining the Contours of the Infringement Test in Cases Involving the 
State Taxation of Non-Indians a Half-Century After Williams v. Lee, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 147 (2012) 
(detailing the various permutations of a state’s ability to tax non-Indians within Indian lands). 
 167.  Public Law 280 is the most egregious form of state control on Indian laws.  In 1953, Public 
Law 83-280 was passed, granting states mandatory criminal jurisdiction over almost all the Indian 
reservations in six states: California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Alaska (Alaska 
was added in 1959).  Id.  The law also left open the option for additional states to take jurisdiction.  
See generally CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND 
PUBLIC LAW 280 (1997).  In contrast, the transfer of civil jurisdiction in these states was more 
nuanced and “primarily intended to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private 
legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private citizens, by per-
mitting the courts of the States to decide such disputes,” and was held to necessarily exclude state 
power to tax tribal members.  Bryan, 426 U.S. at 383.  
 168.  In addition to being one of the biggest spaces for tribal commercial possibilities, Indian 
land often holds a deep connection to the spiritual, mental, and physical health of tribal members. 
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majority of Indian resources, usually with little to no compensation.169  Even 
reservations are sometimes inundated with nonmembers as a result of allot-
ment and similar federal initiatives,170 usually imposed on Indian nations 
without their consent.  For many Indian nations, reservation and trust land is 
the last remaining asset the tribe owns and controls. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The modern tribal market is not the market of the nineteenth century, 
with multiple nations and their citizens converging on Indian country to ex-
ploit untapped natural resources of Indian lands.  The modern tribal market 
still includes natural resource development but now with tribal control.  The 
modern market is otherwise dominated by economic growth arising from en-
hanced tribal governance activities and a multi-billion dollar entertainment 
and tourism industry.  Nonmembers still flock to Indian lands for commercial 
purposes, but they now do so in accordance with the laws of Indian nations. 
Nonmembers that object to tribal laws and jurisdiction are true outliers 
that demand access to the tribal market without giving anything in return.  
Indian nations are willing to allow nonmembers access to the market, but 
nonmembers must comply with tribal laws.  Tribes retain the inherent sover-
eignty to deny access to their commercial markets to those nonmembers un-
willing to be subjected to tribal jurisdiction.  Tribes that have been subject to 
thorough political and economic domination by outsider forces, usually ad-
vanced by the federal government, are often slow to realize and enforce the 
closing of tribal markets to specific individuals.  The twentieth century saw 
a plummet in the number of tribes formally regulating nonmember activities, 
until recently giving nonmembers the mistaken impression that access to the 
tribal market is free.  Like access to any market—formal, under the table, 
sovereign controlled, or voluntary—it is not. 
  
                                                          
 169.  See, e.g., JEFFREY OSTLER, THE LAKOTAS AND THE BLACK HILLS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SACRED GROUND (2010). 
 170.  See supra notes 122–127 and accompanying text.  
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APPENDIX: REPRESENTATIVE OKLAHOMA INDIAN NATIONS’ LAWS 
GOVERNING NONCITIZENS 
Several Oklahoma Indian nations enacted statutes pursuant to its tribal 
authority to govern the entrance, residence, and activities of noncitizens on 
tribal land.  The Table below contains representative examples of tribal stat-
utes that constitute what was then loosely referred to as the “permit system.”  
In large part, the tribes themselves enforced the laws from the 1830s until the 
1880s and 1890s, when the sheer number of noncitizens in violation of tribal 
laws overwhelmed tribal law enforcement capacity.  The United States failed 
to adequately assist the tribes, and in 1898 the federal government stripped 
several tribes of their justice systems.171 
 
 
                                                          
 171.  Curtis Act, Pub. L. No. 55-517, 30 Stat. 495 (1898).  
Tribal Law Relevant Statutory Language Source 
1836 Choctaw Na-
tion Law Governing 
Employment 
 
In 1836, the Choctaw 
Nation enacted a stat-
ute regulating both the 
residence and employ-
ment of “white citi-
zens of the United 
States,” requiring 
them to obtain a per-
mit from either the 
principal chief of the 
Nation or the United 
States Agent. 
Sec. 7. Be it enacted by the General Council of the 
Choctaw Nation assembled, That all white citizens 
of the United States wishing to remain in the Nation 
under employ of any person, citizen of the Choctaw 
Nation, may do so by procuring permission in writ-
ing from the Chief or United States Agent.  But 
should any person, citizen of this Nation, receive 
any white man into his employ, not having the reg-
ular permission to remain in the Nation, and should 
such white man commit any depredation, or run 
away with any property belonging to the Nation, 
the person so employing shall pay all damages, and 
make good to the person or persons for property so 
stolen or injury sustained.  Approved, October 8, 
1836. 
 
 
Act of Oct. 8, 
1836 § 7, re-
printed in CONST. 
& LAWS OF THE 
CHOCTAW 
NATION, 
TOGETHER WITH 
THE TREATIES OF 
1855, 1865 AND 
1866, at 72 
(1869). 
1868 Chickasaw 
Nation Law Gov-
erning Employment 
 
In 1868, the Chicka-
saw Nation enacted a 
law requiring registra-
tion of “white men” 
for hiring purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the Chickasaw 
Nation: That section first of An Act entitled ‘An 
Act in relation to hiring white men,’ be and the 
same is hereby amended so as to substitute ‘County 
Clerks’ of the several counties in the Nation, in-
stead of the National Secretary.  Be it further en-
acted: That the clerk shall receive from the white 
man, registered, one dollar, for which the clerk 
shall give his certificate to the white man so regis-
tered, which receipt shall be good evidence to the 
officers that said white man has been registered ac-
cording to law. 
Act of Sept. 24, 
1868 ch. XLIX, 
reprinted in 
GENERAL LAWS 
OF THE 
LEGISLATURE OF 
THE CHICKASAW 
NATION, at 28 
(1867, 1868, 
1869 & 1870). 
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1885 Sac and Fox 
Nation Law Gov-
erning Employment 
and Rental 
 
In 1885, the Sac and 
Fox Nation enacted a 
comprehensive law 
governing the employ-
ment of “Non-Citi-
zens” or rental of real 
property to “Non-Citi-
zens.” 
 
Sec. 15. Any Citizen of this Nation who may desire 
to employ, for one month, or more, or rent to a citi-
zen of the United States, shall be required to obtain 
a permit for that purpose from the Sac and Fox Ex-
ecutive Council, and be approved by the Indian 
Agent, and the Indian Office at Washington. [¶] 
Sec. 16.  Any citizen of this Nation who may desire 
to employ or rent to a non-citizen Indian, shall be 
required to obtain a permit for that purpose from 
the Sac and Fox Executive Council, and be ap-
proved by the Indian Agent.  [¶] Sec. 17.  For all 
such permits granted, the National Secretary shall 
require of the person obtaining it one dollar for 
every month or fraction more than a month for 
which it is granted.  He shall report to the Treasurer 
at the end of each quarter, and turn over to him all 
of the receipts that may come into his hands for the 
quarter then ending.  [¶] Sec. 18.  After the expira-
tion of the time of the permits, such persons shall 
be deemed an intruder, and it is made the duty of 
the Prosecuting Attorney to report the same to the 
Indian Agent.  [¶] Sec. 19.  Any citizen of this Na-
tion who shall hire or employ any citizen of the 
United States, or non-citizen Indian, in any other 
manner than as provided in the first and second sec-
tions of this article, shall be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and, upon conviction, be fined in any 
sum not less than twenty-five nor exceeding fifty 
dollars, at the discretion of the court.  [¶] Sec. 20.  
That any person fined at any time, upon the Sac and 
Fox reservation, not a citizen of the Nation, or a 
United States officer or employee, and not having a 
permit from the Executive Council, and paid or the 
same according to law, shall be ejected from the 
reservation as the law directs in other cases. 
Employment of 
Non-Citizens, 
Laws of the Sac 
and Fox Nation 
ch. 2, art. V, re-
printed in CONST. 
AND LAWS OF THE 
SAC AND FOX 
NATION (1975). 
1867 Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation Law 
Licensing Traders 
 
In 1867, the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation en-
acted a law requiring 
traders to pay license 
fees to the tribal gov-
ernment for each trad-
ing house operating on 
the reservation. 
Be it further enacted, That all licensed traders set-
tling in this Nation shall pay a tax of one hundred 
dollars ($100) for each and every trading house. 
CIV. CODE OF 
LAWS § 10, re-
printed in CONST. 
AND CIV. AND 
CRIM. CODE OF 
THE MUSKOKEE 
NATION 11 
(1867). 
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1849 Choctaw Na-
tion Law Barring 
“White Men” from 
Raising Stock 
 
In 1849, the Choctaw 
Nation enacted a law 
barring “white men” 
from raising stock 
within reservation 
boundaries unless they 
were married to a 
Chocktaw woman. 
Be it enacted by the General Council of the Choc-
taw Nation assembled, That from and after the pas-
sage of this act, no white man who has not married 
a native of this Nation shall ever be allowed to raise 
any stock within the limits of this Nation. 
Act of Oct. 10, 
1849, § 6, re-
printed in CONST. 
AND LAWS OF THE 
CHOCTAW 
NATION, 
TOGETHER WITH 
THE TREATIES OF 
1855, 1865 AND 
1866, at 103 
(1869). 
1859 Choctaw Law 
Removing White 
Men Residing With-
out a Permit 
 
In 1859, the Choctaw 
Nation provided for 
the removal of “white 
men” residing on the 
reservation without a 
permit. 
 
 
Be it enacted by the General Council of the Choc-
taw Nation assembled, That it shall be the special 
duty of the Sheriff in each county of this Nation, to 
give prompt and immediate notice to the Governor 
of this Nation, of all white men, who are residing, 
or who may reside within the limits of their respec-
tive counties, without a license or permit from the 
proper authorities of this nation.  Be it further en-
acted, That the Governor of this Nation is hereby 
authorized, and directed to take the necessary steps 
to cause the removal of all such persons as may be 
residing here without any license, or permit. 
Act of Oct. 17, 
1859, reprinted in 
CONST. AND 
LAWS OF THE 
CHOCTAW 
NATION, 
TOGETHER WITH 
THE TREATIES OF 
1855, 1865 AND 
1866, at 206 
(1869). 
Nineteenth-Century 
Osage Laws Re-
quiring Permit for 
Intermarriage 
 
The Osage Nation 
constitution provided 
for the legalization of 
intermarriage with 
white men only after 
the completion of a 
detailed procedure for 
the procurement of a 
license. 
To Legalize Intermarriage with White Men. . . .  
Whereas the peace and prosperity of the Osage peo-
ple require that, in the enforcement of the laws, ju-
risdiction of the civil laws should be exercised over 
all persons whatever, who may, from time to time, 
be privileged to reside within the limits of the 
Osage Nation: therefore, any white man or citizen 
of the United States, who may hereafter come into 
the country to marry an Osage woman, shall first be 
required to make known his intentions to the Na-
tional Council by applying for a license, and such 
license may, under the authority of the National 
Council, be issued by the clerk thereof; any person 
so obtaining a license shall pay to the clerk, the sum 
of twenty dollars ($20.00) for such license, and take 
an oath to support the Constitution and abide by the 
laws of the Osage Nation; which oath may be ad-
ministered by the President of the National Council, 
or the Clerk of the body, authorized for that pur-
pose, and it shall be the duty of the Clerk to record 
the same in the Journals of the National Council.  
But if any such white man, or citizen of the United 
States, shall refuse to subscribe to the oath, he shall 
not be entitled to the rights of citizenship, and shall 
forthwith be removed without the limits of the 
Osage Nation as an intruder. 
CONST. OF THE 
OSAGE NATION, 
art. IX, § 1, re-
printed in 
TREATIES AND 
LAWS OF THE 
OSAGE NATION, 
AS PASSED TO 
NOV. 26, 1890, at 
90 (1895). 
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